Epistemic protocols are communication protocols aiming at transfer of knowledge in a controlled way. Typically, the preconditions or goals for protocol actions depend on the knowledge of agents, often in nested form. Informal epistemic protocol descriptions for muddy children, coordinated attack, dining cryptographers, Russian cards, secret key exchange are well known. The contribution of this paper is a formal study of a natural requirement on epistemic protocols, that the contents of the protocol can be assumed to be common knowledge. By formalizing this requirement we can prove that there can be no unbiased deterministic protocol for the Russian cards problem. For purposes of our formal analysis we introduce an epistemic protocol language, and we show that its model checking problem is decidable.
Introduction
Epistemic protocols have figured in puzzle books for quite some time; an early reference for the muddy children protocol is [9] ; they also figure as standard examples in textbooks on epistemic logic [5, 18] . A formal study of epistemic protocols should investigate a number of natural properties of a protocol. More precisely, the protocol should prescribe what happens no matter what the initial situation is, and it should remain correct if the protocol itself is commonly known, including its goal and the precise preconditions for each action in the protocol.
Starting points for our investigation are the perspective on knowledge in perfect cryptography from [12] , the analysis of Russian cards problems in [15, 2, 18, 16] and the analysis of multiparty secret key exchange in [7, 8, 4 ].
Compared to the flourishing field of formal verification of communication protocols that started from [3] , one thing still lacking from the above accounts is a welldefined language for specifying epistemic protocols. As a consequence of this, formal verification of epistemic protocols is not easy.
Consider the case of Russian cards problems [15] . A Russian cards problem is a specification of a random card distribution among a set of three participants, together with a goal of communicating the hand of one participant to another participant by public announcements, in such a way that the third participant does not learn any card in the actual hands of the other two participants. Solutions to this should take the form of exhaustive lists of concrete distribution of cards with matching announcements, such that the protocol can be executed under an arbitrary initial distribution of cards, not just for specific ones. In this paper we will give formal specifications of such protocols. We then can make formal distinctions that have not been made before with informal descriptions of epistemic protocols, like that between deterministic and nondeterministic protocols, and analyze their properties. For example, the 7-hand direct exchange solutions to the Russian cards problem provided in [15] suggest unbiased (non-deterministic) protocols that may work on every initial distribution. However, we show that a deterministic protocol that is executable on arbitrary initial distributions exists for this, but that it is necessarily biased.
A notable feature of epistemic protocols, compared to more usual communication protocols, is that the correctness of the epistemic protocols heavily relies on the assumptions of the agents' meta knowledge about the protocol itself. It is reasonable to assume that the protocol and its goals are commonly known by all the agents including possible adversaries, if we want to apply the protocol repeatedly in real life cases. The following example of a tentative four hand solution
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for Russian cards problem RCP 2.2.1 1 illustrates how such meta knowledge matters in the verification of the protocol. To check the correctness of protocols under the assumption that the protocol in commonly known, formalization of protocols is clearly imperative.
Example 1 (Guess My Cards) There are 5 cards (0-4) and three agents {A, B, E}; agent A has two cards, B has two cards, and E has only one card. A wants to inform B of his hand by public announcement, without revealing his cards to E. A 'promising protocol' for this is that A announces the disjunction of his actual hand (say 01) with all the different combinations of the remaining cards, so he would announce "I have 01 or 23 or 24 or 34." Since B has one more card than E he can eliminate all of 23, 24 and 34, while E can only eliminate two of 23, 24 and 34. However, it does not work like this anymore if E knows that the protocol is meant to reveal A's hand to B. Assume that E has 3. Then E will know that A has either 01 or 24. Now suppose that A has 24 and B has 01. Then B could not have learnt A's hand from A's announcement. So E can infer that A has 01. Another way to see that the would-be protocol is wrong is as follows. The procedure to generate the announcement should also be commonly known. In the above case this procedure is a function from card hands to announcements f (xy) =" I have xy or z 1 z 2 or z 2 z 3 or z 1 z 3 .", where z 1 , z 2 , z 3 are the remaining 3 cards other than x, y. This function is injective, so the announcement reveals the hand immediately.
Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are:
• An expressive protocol specification and verification language whose model checking is decidable.
• Formal specifications and checks of epistemic protocols under common knowledge, from which it follows that:
-the sequential muddy children protocol can be formally proved correct;
-there is a correct, deterministic biased protocol for RCP 3.3.1 ;
-there is no correct, deterministic and unbiased 2-step protocol for RCP 3.3.1 ;
-the non-deterministic 1-bit secret key generation protocol can be formally proved correct.
1 The parameters n.n.k express that first agent and second agent each have n cards, and the third has k cards.
Structure of the paper We define the protocol specification language in Section 2. Section 3 talks about epistemic protocols in normal forms and their verification problem under common knowledge. Deterministic protocols for Russian cards problems are studied in Section 4. We also demonstrate nondeterministic protocol verification in Section 5 by looking at a simplified secret-key generation protocol.
Preliminaries
Informally, epistemic protocols are the communication patterns which make use of agents' epistemic reasoning power in executions, in order to guarantee the exchange of certain information without leaking undesired information to the possible adversaries. In this paper we focus on the ones which implement public announcements as the only communication methods, since public announcements are the simplest and best studied communication method in logic [18] .
Language and Semantics
We define an Epistemic Protocol Language L EP for specifying epistemic protocols and for reasoning about them. The language is kept as simple as possible. More realistic versions may have agent variable assignment, to express things like "for agent := 1 to n do . . . ". The protocols are meant to be general; there is no intrinsic link between agents and announcements. Such links can be established by restricting announcements to the form "agent a knows that . . . ".
Assume p ranges over Φ and a over an agent set Ag. The protocol language is a variation on dynamic epistemic languages as defined in [14, 13] , with public announcement [!φ] as the basic communicative operation. The new twist in this paper is that public announcements are among the epistemic programs π as defined below. Further on, when we discuss the specification and analysis of unbiased protocols, we will extend the language with a graded modality.
Below, we will be more specific about basic propositions p, and may take them to be of the certain forms, e.g. has a x for a ∈ Ag, for certain applications. We employ the usual abbreviations: φ ∨ ψ, φ → ψ and π φ are shorthand for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ), ¬φ ∨ ψ and ¬[π]¬φ, respectively. The truth value of a L EP formula φ in a state s of a multi-S5 Kripke model M = (S, {∼ i |i ∈ Ag}, V ), is defined by:
where π are epistemic programs functioning as model changers:
where M| ψ is the restriction of M to the states where ψ holds; •, ∪ and * at right-hand side express the usual composition, union and reflexive transitive closure on relations respectively.
As usual, in order to emphasise the intuitive epistemic meanings of some of our operators, we write K a φ for [a]φ and we use Cφ for [( i∈Ag i) * ]φ (the common knowledge operator).
A notable difference between our language and the PDL-style dynamic epistemic languages as in [14, 13] is that we treat atomic programs and announcements in an uniform way. Thus, we not only allow complicated program constructions on announcements like (!φ∪!ψ)
* but also the interaction between atomic programs and announcements. For example, [(!ψ; (a ∪ b)) * ]φ expresses conditional common knowledge of φ among a, b w.r.t. announcements. When we interpret basic programs as arbitrary basic actions as in PDL, then (?ψ; (!ψ∪a)) * can express a protocol which makes choices repeatedly between an announcement and a basic action while ψ holds.
To understand the expressivity better, we identify a fragment of L EP which can be translated into PDL. Call a formula echo-free if it has no public announcements in the scope of a star. Any echo-free L EP formula can be translated into a formula without announcements, by proceeding in two steps. The first translation t is as follows:
This yields an equivalent formula where each program π either has the form !φ or is announcement-free. Thus the transformed formulas of t can be regarded as LCC formulas in [13] , if we consider the public announcements as the corresponding single-pointed action models. Next, apply the translation procedure T in [13] to transform the LCC formulas into P DL.
The translation T • t thus yields an equivalent PDL formula, for all echo-free L EP formulas. Note that this translation cannot be extended to the full L EP language, due to the result of [11] which states that the satisfiability problem of a language containing at least iterated relativization ((!φ) * ) and common knowledge operators is undecidable, even on finite models. However, for model checking problem we have:
Proposition 1 Model checking L EP on finite Kripke models is decidable.
Proof : The idea of the proof is based on the observation that the epistemic programs are eliminative in nature. We want to turn L EP model checking M, s φ into PDL-style model checking on a larger finite model N such that instead of interpreting π in φ as model changers on M, we can see π as a label for a relation in N . Intuitively, we build N by making all the possible pointed sub-models (M , s ) of M as the states in N . In N , the a-relations ∼ N a are defined as follows:
. Now we are ready to compute all the corresponding relations of π in N by usual treatments in PDL model checking algorithms for PDL-operators ; , ∪ and * and the following operation to deal with !φ : M , s → !φ M , s iff M = M | φ and s = s . To compute M | φ we need to call the model checking algorithm again but since φ is strictly simpler than φ, we will finally arrive at a situation that can be handled by the PDL model checking algorithm. 2
Epistemic protocols
In this section, we address the epistemic protocols and their verification problem formally. We first restrict ourselves to a sub-language L SP of L EP with proposition set P and agent set Ag, in order to specify the epistemic protocols in a simpler but adequate form:
Intuitively we want to specify a sequence of conditional announcements which may involve non-deterministic choices. Actions ?φ; !ψ are guarded announcements, with φ as the precondition and ψ as the message.
Note that a protocol often comes with assumptions about the initial situation where the protocol can be applied and implicitly a set of "axioms" about the facts which should remain true while the protocol is running. These define the "physical setting" of the protocol. For example, in RCP we may assume that at the beginning each player has a certain number of different cards and for each card c it holds that has i c → j =i ¬has j c, where has j c is a basic proposition with the obvious meaning: j has card c. In this paper we will not focus on the specification of the initial states, but assume that given a protocol Prot, there is an initial model M Prot , with a set of axioms T Prot which are valid on M Prot and remain valid while executing the protocol 2 . T Prot is used in the following to define deterministic protocols which intuitively can execute only one action at any time starting from the initial situation.
Definition 1 (Epistemic Protocol) An epistemic protocol Prot is a pair π Prot , Φ Prot where π Prot is an epistemic program in the language L SP and Φ Prot is a set of (announcement-free) formulas serving as the goal of the protocol. A step of Prot is a guarded action or a choice among guarded actions. A step ?φ 1 ; !ψ 1 ∪· · · ∪?φ n ; !ψ n is called deterministic if it holds that ∀i = j < n :
A protocol is called deterministic if each of its steps is, and non-deterministic if it is not deterministic. A protocol Prot is of definite length if π Prot is echo-free, otherwise it is of indefinite length. The length of a protocol of definite length is the number of its steps.
Note that the goals in the above definition are intended to be met at the end of the protocol, but our formalism can also express checks of protocol steps, by sequentially composing the step π with a guarded command ?φ; ! (effectively a check of φ).
An epistemic protocol is expected to be implemented in an environment where every announcement is publicly broadcasted in the possible presence of some passive eavesdropper. A run of the protocol is a sequence of guarded announcements ?φ; !ψ, which is executable on the initial model according to the protocol specification. We will assume that no different instantiations of a protocol run in parallel.
Definition 2 (Verification of Epistemic Protocol)
Verification of an epistemic protocol Prot is checking whether all the goals hold after any run or some 2 Formally TProt can be considered as a subset of the formulas that are not only valid at MProt but also preserved under any π operations. 
Note that in most applications, the initial models are connected, assuming that the agents are perfect reasoners who can imagine the possibilities others may think given the facts they can observe. Now we can use common knowledge to reformulate the verification problem:
This means to verify that a protocol is correct under any possible initial information distribution is to check the common knowledge of the correctness of the protocol at some arbitrary initial situation.
As we motivated in the introduction, we assume the protocol is commonly known in the following sense:
1. The guards of the actions are commonly known; 2. The truthfulness of the announcements is commonly known;
3. The goals of the protocol are commonly known.
Such requirements call for a bit of further streamlining on the form of protocols in our framework. To motivate this, consider the following choice:
(?q; !¬p) ∪ (?¬q; !p).
According to requirement (1) above, the agent should be able to learn q from the announcement of ¬p. In general, for each guarded action ?φ; !ψ, we can make the precondition commonly known by announcing it too. Thus we may assume: ψ → φ is valid. According to the above requirement (2), for each ?φ; !ψ that occurs in a protocol we may assume that φ → ψ is valid. Some reflection shows that the above requirements together boil down to the requirement that in each guarded action the guard and the announcement are the same. Thus, we can restrict our attention to choices of the following normal form:
i ?!φ i , where ?!φ i is an abbreviation for ?φ i ; !φ i 3 .
Given an epistemic protocol Prot, we can transform every step ?φ 1 ; !ψ 1 ∪ · · · ∪?φ n ; !ψ n of it into the right shape under the assumptions of (1) and (2) by the following procedure:
• Lump the same actions in each step of the protocol together: if ψ 1 = · · · = ψ m then we can replace ?φ 1 ; !ψ 1 ∪ · · · ∪?φ m ; !ψ m by an equivalent single guarded action ?(φ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ φ m ); !ψ 1 .
• Transform every appearance of ?
To implement requirement (3), the straightforward idea would be simply checking the common knowledge of the correctness of the protocol (C[π]φ or C π φ).
We will show this is indeed enough to guarantee the protocol is correct under the assumption that the agents know the goals that the protocol should fulfil.
Let us start from the observation made in [15] that just checking M, w [!ψ]φ goal is sometimes not sufficient, for a one step protocol !ψ aiming at establishing φ goal . Indeed, if the agents know the intended goal of the protocol then they will assume that others do not perform actions which do not lead to the goal. Such an assumption gives agents the power to reason more, as we also saw in Section 1, which sometimes destroys the correctness of the protocol. Now we can try to make agents know the goal of protocol by announcing it.
In [15] the author proposed that the verification should be undertaken while an announcement !ψ is interpreted more than just announcing ψ 4 :
The idea behind this is that we announce the goal of the announcement to make sure that under the assumption that agents know the goal, the protocol is still correct. However, if [!(ψ ∧ [!ψ]φ goal )]φ goal is now assumed and known by agents, we still need to make sure that knowing this again does not affect the correctness of the protocol. We can iterate such reasoning ad libitum. Formally we define:
We can simplify η i+1 , by making use of the valid for-
We actually need to check all η i , since there are cases where all the η i are logically different 5 .
Notice that if φ goal is in the shape of Cφ then
due to the fact that [!Cφ]Cφ is a valid formula [18] , thus making the infinite process of checking η i manageable. In [15] , the author suggests that instead of checking property φ, we should check property Cφ.
Note that the simplification in Proposition 3 works on the one-announcement-protocols, but it is not very clear how to deal with the more complicated forms of the epistemic protocols as we defined in this paper. Thus checking common knowledge after the run of the protocol may not be grounded.
Now we take another perspective, instead of reinterpreting each announcements, we address the formula to be checked as a whole. Intuitively, we strengthen [π]φ goal by some ψ such that:
• ψ should imply [π]φ goal .
• if [π]ψ goal is true then truthfully announcing φ in advance should not change the truth value of [π]φ goal .
Thus formally we require:
However, it is not hard to see that the common knowledge of the correctness of the protocol itself is indeed a fixed point for f (X):
Cφ goal is not always a fixed point of f (X). 5 Consider the dynamic epistemic analysis of the traditional Muddy Children puzzle [18] . There is always a model M, s such that M, s [!ψ; !φ; . . .
]φ where φ is the formula that expresses "We do not know whether we are dirty or not". The above fixed point analysis also apply to C π φ goal in case we check liveness properties. Thus we can now define verification epistemic protocols under common knowledge:
Definition 3 (Verification under Common Knowledge) Verification of an epistemic protocol Prot under common knowledge is checking M Prot C[π Prot ]φ goal for safety properties or checking M Prot C π Prot φ goal for liveness properties.
Now let us look at a variation of classic Muddy
Children to demonstrate how we specify and verify an epistemic protocol.
Example 2 (Sequential n-Muddy children [19])
The setting is as follows: some of n children (1, 2, . . . , n) got mud on their foreheads while playing. The children can see whether other kids are dirty, but there is no mirror for them to discover themselves whether they are dirty or not. Now the father walks in and states: "At least one of you is dirty!" Then he asks the children 1, 2, . . . , n one by one (i.e., sequentially),"Do you know whether you are dirty?" until he has asked everyone. The children have to answers "Y es or "N o" truthfully. Suppose child j is the last dirty child in the sequence. Then j will know that he is dirty when it is his time to answer. And all the children after him will know that they are clean. But the j − 1 children before j will remain ignorant all the time about whether they are dirty or clean (under the usual assumption that the children are honest and perfect reasoners). Here are the formal details of the protocol:
• Let d i be the basic proposition expressing "child i is dirty" and c i be ¬d i .
• Let ToKorNot i = (?!Know i ) ∪ (?!¬Know i ) express that i truthfully announces whether he knows he is dirty or not, where
6 Reflexive arrows are omitted.
• Let LastDirty i be the formula d i ∧ j>i c j expressing that d i is the last dirty child according to the ordering >.
Then Prot SMD = π SMDn , {φ SMDn } where
} is a connected model where:
Clearly Prot SMD is deterministic since the child can only know or not know whether himslef is dirty, no matter what T Prot is. Nevertheless, the following intuitive axiom says all the children can see whether others are dirty or not:
We can then verify the π SMDn :
Deterministic Protocols for Russian Cards Problem

Formalizing Russian Cards Problem
In this section, we study deterministic 2-step protocols for Russian cards problem that can be executed under arbitrary initial distribution of cards, not for a particular distribution as in many previous discussions [15, 18] . We show that there can only be deterministic protocols for RCP 3.3.1 with uneven appearances of cards in the announcements.
We first model the general case of RCP n.n.k : Let I = {A, B, E} be the set of players, Dk = {0, 1, ..., 2n + k − 1} be the set of 2n + k cards, Hs h be the set of h-hands (e.g. Hs 3 = {{x, y, z} | x, y, z ∈ Dk and x, y, z are different}). Let has i x be the basic proposition meaning that player i has card x; has i X be the shorthand of x∈X has i x. T Prot = {OneCardInOneP,EkCards,ABnCards,KnowThyself} where:
• EkCards: X∈Hs k has E X;
ABnCards: i∈{A,B} X∈Hs n has i X
• OneCardInOneP: i =j ( x∈Dk (has i x → ¬has j x)
• KnowThyself: i∈I X∈Hs k (has i X → K i has i X)
where:
• V (has i x)(w) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ w i .
The goals of the protocol are:
If the protocol Prot is deterministic, and executable on arbitrary initial distribution then according to the previous section, we check
The following proposition shows that we can then safely focus on the first step of the protocol which should satisfy φ 1 and φ 3 .
Proposition 7
If there is an one-step protocol π such that M Prot C π (φ 1 ∧ φ 3 ), then there is a π such that M Prot C π; π (φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ∧ φ 3 ).
It is not hard to see that φ 1 is monotonic to model relativizations, namely if it is true at M, s then it is true in any possible restrictions of M, s. Thus M Prot C π; π φ 1 . For φ 3 , first we know from Proposition 5,
Therefore for each world s where E's actual hand is X, M Prot , s π K E K B has E X. Thus truthfully announcing K B has E X will not change the worlds that E considers possible. Thus for factual formula ψ 7 It is easy to see that MProt
TProt, but not everything valid in MProt are specified in TProt, e.g. let φ = V i =j∈I V x∈Dk (hasjx → ¬Kihasjx), then MProt φ but TProt φ. TProt includes the hard facts which remain unchanged while the protocol is applied. However, some agents may know something they did not know before.
(without knowledge operators),
Now we restrict the form of our protocol further by the adaption of a result from [15] , which states that to announce only A's alternative hands is enough.
Proposition 8 If a correct 2-step protocol of the Russian cards problem RCP n.n.k exists, there is another correct protocol with the first step in the form of:
where P a i is in the form of j≤m has A X j (i.e. A's alternative hands).
We now prove a lemma for our negative result later in this section.
Lemma 1
The first step of a correct 2-step deterministic protocol of the Russian cards problem RCP n.n.k should at least satisfy:
1. each possible hand appears once and only once in ?!P a 0 ∪?!P a 1 ∪ · · · ∪?!P a m .
2. any two hands in one announcement P a j can only share at most n − k − 1 common cards.
Proof : For (1): From Proposition 8 and the requirement that M Prot C π Prot we know every hand should appear at least once. From the fact that protocol should be deterministic, every hand can only appear once. In the following, given a hand X of A, let P a(X) be the announcement P a j in the protocol such that has A X is a disjunct of P a j . For (2): To let B know A's cards after A's announcement, we should make sure that given A's hand X, for any B's hand Z, the alternatives in P a(X) will be ruled out. Namely, for any different hands X, Y ∈ P a(X), any hand Z ⊆ Dk\X that B may have: Z ∩ Y = ∅. This means that for every two hands X, Y in P a i , the number of cards different from the cards in X ∪Y must be less than n. Otherwise there is a possible hand Z which does not intersect with both X and Y . Thus, we have |Dk| − |Y ∪ X| < n. Since |Dk| = 2n + k, |Y ∪ X| > n + k. Therefore it is not hard to see that
In the following we will concentrate on the original Russian cards problem RCP 3.3.1 as coined in [15] . We first show that there is a deterministic protocol:
Theorem 1 There is a correct, 2-step deterministic protocol for RCP 3. Lemma 2 The first step of an unbiased deterministic protocol for RCP 3.3.1 must satisfy the following:
1. each announcement P a j contains, and only contains, 7 alternative hands.
2. there are in total 5 alternative announcements in the protocol.
3. every two hands in the same announcement have exactly one card in common.
Proof : For (1): If all the cards appear evenly (suppose g times) in any announcement with k hands, then 3k = 7g. So the minimal k is 7, and each card appears 3 times. We claim that if k is greater than 7 then there must be two hands which share more than 1 cards. Note that there are only C (1), then the hands 14c and 24c must also appear in the same announcement for some cards c, c . Since every two hands should not have two cards in common then c, c ∈ X ∪ Y thus c, c ∈ Dk\X ∪ Y , namely c = c = 0. However now 14c and 24c have two cards in common, contradiction.
2
Moreover, we need to require that E cannot infer some card is more likely than others to be held by A. To formally specify this requirement we need some form of graded modality as in [6] . Since here we only need to express whether has A x and has A y are equally possible to E, we introduce a 2-ary modalities B a into the language L SP with the following semantics:
M, s B a (ψ, φ) ⇐⇒ a (s, φ) = a (s, ψ) where a (s, χ)|{t | s ∼ a t and M, t χ}|. Clearly, adding this modality does not destroy the decidability of the model checking problem on finite models. Now we can show that an unbiased protocol, if exists, also guarantees that player E does not have a lucky guess:
Proposition 9
If there exists an unbiased protocol π Prot for RCP 3,3,1 then M Prot C π Prot x,y∈Dk ((¬K E ¬has A x ∧ ¬K E ¬has A y) → B E (has A x, has A y)).
Proof :Given an announcement P a(as a set of alternative hands) in an unbiased protocol for RCP 3.3.1 , for any card c ∈ Dk, let S E = {X|c ∈ X and X ∈ P a}. From Lemma 1, we know that the alternative hands in S c E should not have 2 cards in common. So any card that appears in S c E only appears once.
From the proof of statement 1 in Lemma 2, we know every card in Dk\{c} must appear in S c E . Thus every card in Dk\{c} only appears once in the hands in S c E . Since P a is unbiased then P a\S c E is still unbiased. Thus it is not hard to see that M Prot C π Prot x,y∈Dk ((¬K E ¬has A x ∧ ¬K E ¬has A y) → B E (has A x, has A y)).
The authors of [2] showed that unbiased nondeterministic protocols exist, by making use of probabilistic selections 9 . However, in the following, we show that there is no deterministic protocol which is unbiased.
Theorem 2 There is no correct deterministic 2-step protocol which is unbiased for RCP 3.3.1 .
Proof :We prove the theorem by proving the following stronger claim first:
